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are heterogeneously informed about the state of the world. Due to the
asymmetries in government responsibility between candidates, the in-
cumbent’s statement may convey information on the relevance of the
issues to voters. In equilibrium, the incumbent sometimes strate-
gically releases his statement early and thus signals the importance
of his signature issue to the voters. We find that, since the incum-
bent’s positioning on the issue reveals private information which the
challenger can use in later statements, the incumbent’s incentives to
distort the campaign are decreasing in his quality, as previously doc-
umented by the empirical literature. The distortions arising in equi-
librium are decreasing in the incumbent’s effective ability; however,
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1. Introduction
“We have alarming news from the Middle East. There is talk of a
war. [. . .] Germany is willing to show solidarity, but is not available
for adventures.”
— German Chancellor Gerhard Schro¨der, August 1st, 2002
With this statement, the German Chancellor took a very popular position
against the participation in an armed conflict and put the Iraq issue on the polit-
ical agenda for the general election on September 22nd, 2002. Only hours earlier,
the council meeting of his Social Democratic Party had decided to immediately
start, earlier than planned, the final phase of the election campaign. At the time,
economic problems of unemployment and recession put the incumbent coalition of
Social Democrats and Greens under pressure. In polls, they were clear second be-
hind the conservative opposition. Within one month of the above statement, the
perceived importance of the Iraq conflict jumped from 6th to 2nd rank although
it was very uncertain that a war would ever be fought and German support ever
requested from the US. The September elections saw the incumbent coalition
confirmed.1
This example shows vividly the incumbent’s strength in shaping the political
agenda – the perception of relevant issues – and in influencing the campaign
election. Our paper links the empirically established phenomenon of incumbency
advantage to the timing of the political announcements in an electoral campaign.
In our model, an incumbent, when competing against a challenger candidate for
reelection, can credibly signal the relevance of an issue to the voters because of
government responsibilities that force him to act on problems that have a par-
ticularly urgent and relevant nature. He can use this ability to also make salient
1Fu¨rtig (2007, pp. 314-317) describes the campaign and its context in detail. The quote is due
to the Ddp News Agency as quoted in Fu¨rtig (2007, p. 316).
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those issues on which he is particularly competent. The flipside of this govern-
ment responsibility is that an important issue might require immediate political
action and force him to position himself. As a consequence, the challenger can
position himself optimally in response to the incumbent’s action. This trade-off
between influencing the agenda and revealing information governs the analysis of
campaign statements in this paper.
We model this trade-off in an electoral campaign over two periods with two
political issues. The campaign is run by two politicians, a challenger and an
incumbent. The challenger can only make statements about his proposed policies
in the second period, while the incumbent can choose to take a stand on one issue
in the first period. As a consequence, we can interpret period 1 as the last period
of the previous government, and period 2 as the proper electoral campaign.
We assume that the incumbent is specialized on one of the two issues in the
sense that he holds more precise information on that issue. The nature of his
specialization (i.e. the issue on which he is more competent) is common knowl-
edge; however we assume that the extent of his specialization is the incumbent’s
private information. The incumbent may have an incentive to focus the voters’
attention on his signature issue by announcing his policy in period 1. This strat-
egy is effective since it shifts the voters’ perception of which issue is “relevant”
and therefore may shift the perception of the best candidate. The incumbent’s
power to change the voters’ beliefs on the relevance of the issues results from
the existence of “urgencies” in which he is forced to take a stand on the urgent
and therefore relevant issue. The incumbent’s actions in period 1 may thus be
informative about the nature of the relevant issue.
The incumbent’s incentive to take an early stand and influence the debate
is however mitigated by the above mentioned trade-off: early announcements
disclose the incumbent’s private information not only to the voters, but also to the
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challenger, who can best respond to it. Therefore, in equilibrium it is not always
optimal for an excellent incumbent to reveal his precise information and influence
the electorate’s political agenda. In other words, the returns to incumbency are
decreasing in the quality of the incumbent. This is in line with the findings of
the empirical literature; Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011) show how the incumbent’s
opportunistic behavior that distorts the electoral campaign diminishes when the
incumbent’s win-margin increases. Gordon and Landa (2009) provide a sequence
of models in which high quality incumbents benefit less from the incumbency
advantage, with the best incumbents potentially suffering from incumbency.
Our model shows that this result does not translate in a monotonically more
efficient outcome. In particular we find that welfare is influenced both by the
incumbent’s ability and by the perception on such ability. While an incumbent
with a better specialization is always more beneficial, the challenger mimics the
incumbent only when he believes that his information and thus quality is good
enough. A challenger that mimics rather than challenges is not providing the vot-
ers with alternatives, therefore an incumbent with a better reputation does not
necessarily result in better options. The inefficiencies that arise from the incum-
bent’s and the challenger’s behavior therefore respond differently to the perceived
and the effective ability: first of all they are decreasing in the incumbent’s effec-
tive expertise. Their response to the incumbent’s reputation for specialization
instead vary: if the incumbent’s effective expertise is low an increase in his repu-
tation will increase the inefficiencies; if his effective expertise is high an increase
in his reputation will decrease them. There is therefore an interesting interaction
between the incumbent’s characteristics and his reputation in the determination
of the welfare.
Our model is related to two different branches of the literature. The main
one is the wide literature on the incumbency advantage. The common explana-
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tions for such an advantage can be grouped in four categories: (i) Environmental
characteristics of the campaign that make the campaigning process easier for
the incumbent.2 (ii) Incumbent’s characteristics that differ from the challenger’s
ones through the selection process of the previous election.3 (iii) The incumbent’s
position provides opportunities he uses in his favor.4
The rationale that we provide for the existence of an incumbency advantage
falls in the latter category. The incumbent is able to actively distort the elec-
toral campaign in order to increase his chances of being elected. The models
that are closest in spirit to ours are by Hodler, Loertscher and Rohner (2010),
Dellis (2009) and Glazer and Lohmann (1999). The first paper considers the
pre-election implementation of inefficient policies that later increase the pressure
to act on the incumbent’s signature issues. In the paper the authors find that in-
termediate types of the incumbent have more incentives to distort the campaign.
Our model differs from theirs in the channel through which distortions to the elec-
toral campaign are induced (timing of the policy promises vs. inefficient policy
implementation) and in the comparative statics of the distortions. In our work
we find both distortions induced directly by the incumbent’s actions, and distor-
tions induced by the challenger’s best response. As a consequence we are able to
separate the effects of the incumbent’s ability from the effects of the perception
of such ability. Dellis (2009) and Glazer and Lohmann (1999) analyze how the
treatment of some issues now can influence which other issues will be salient in
the next election. Dellis (2009) analyzes this phenomenon when policy makers are
constrained to implement only one policy per period, while Glazer and Lohmann
2See, for example, Prior (2006) who assumes a greater media coverage for the incumbent and
Gordon, Huber and Landa (2007) who investigate the effects of entry costs for the challenger.
3See, for example, Ashworth and de Mesquita (2008) who model how a quality-based incum-
bency advantage endogenously arises through electoral selection and strategic challenger
entry.
4Examples are an increased constituency service (Fiorina, 1977) or redistricting (Cox and
Katz, 2002).
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(1999) consider an electoral competition in which the incumbent government can
have policy commitment before the election. Both papers are framed in a setup
that is structurally different from ours as they deal with ideological candidates
that can make issues salient by avoiding to implement a policy on them; we
take an opposite view on this, as the incumbent in our model can increase the
saliency of one issue only by taking an early stand on it, and by doing so he is
forced to disclose his information to the challenger who can best respond to it.
A complementary analysis of the use of information in the incumbent-challenger
race is provided by Ashworth and Shotts (2011), who analyze the effects of the
strategic choice of a challenger who can provide soft or hard information on the
incumbent’s policy choice to the voter. In their model, an incumbent advantage
arises when the challenger is silent, as part of the optimal incentive scheme that
induces the challenger to gather costly information.
A second related branch of the literature considers agenda setting and the
timing of statements. Petrocik (1996) introduced the view that the perceived
competence of a politician in a particular field (“issue ownership”) is relevant
for his success. Abbe, Goodliffe, Herrnson and Patterson (2003) modeled how
politicians’ success depends on whether their core competencies are “high on
the agenda”. Our setup is inspired by these concepts; we model the agenda by
issues’ true relevance for the voters and the competency of the candidates by the
precision of their information.
Section 2 introduces the general features of the model. The analysis of the
equilibria is contained in Section 3. Section 4 presents an analysis of the distor-
tions that the incumbency advantage may induce. Section 5 concludes after a
brief discussion.
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2. The model
We consider a two-period model in which an incumbent I and a challenger C
compete to be elected by a voter after a two-period electoral campaign on issues
a and b. The optimal policy on each issue j = a, b is equal to the state of the
world on that issue, ωj ∈ {−1, 1}, where both states are equally likely. The
state of the world on each issue is unknown during the campaign, and voters and
candidates are heterogeneously informed about ωj.
2.1. Voter
We assume that we have a representative voter. At the beginning of period 1, the
voter receives two private signals vj, j = a, b, about issue j’s state of the world,
where vj = ωj with probability δ >
1
2
; signals are independent across issues. The
precision of the signal δ is common knowledge.
The voter’s utility is affected only by the policy implemented on one of the
issues, which we call the “relevant” issue. The identity of the relevant issue is
ex-ante unknown; the voter’s belief is that a is the relevant issue with probability
r; r is the voter’s private information.
Given his signals, the voter follows a simple behavioral rule. At the time of the
election he votes for the best candidate on the issue that he views more likely to
be relevant. If both candidates propose the same policy on that issue the voter
randomizes with equal probability between the two candidates.5
5We are aware that this is a strong assumption in a model with two issues, but we believe
that it is a useful representation of electoral processes with many independent issues. Under
such conditions boundedly rational voters may be induced to consider only the set of issues
that they believe will be more relevant for the next period. They cast their vote comparing
candidates only on these issues and do not use less relevant issues as a tie-breaker, but rather
idiosyncratic, random differences between candidates that are not explicitly modelled here.
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2.2. Candidates
There are two candidates, an incumbent I and a challenger C. Candidates maxi-
mize the probability of being elected by taking one of two positions pj ∈ {−1, 1}
on each issue.
Both candidates’ belief on r is described by a uniform distribution over the
interval [0, k] with 1
2
< k < 1. Therefore the candidates’ and the voter believe a
to be the more relevant issue with probability 2k−1
2k
< 1
2
; this implies that the two
issues are asymmetric from an ex-ante perspective.
Candidates are asymmetric in three ways. First, at the beginning of period 1
each candidate receives signals on the state of the world with different precisions.
The incumbent’s signal on issue j is sj ∈ {−1, 1} and the challenger’s is tj ∈
{−1, 1}. C’s signal tj is correct with probability δj = δ ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
for both issues,
reflecting that he is not specialized on any issue.6 The incumbent is instead
specialized on issue a, and not competent on issue b. More precisely I’s signal on
b is uninformative, γb =
1
2
, while I is specialized on issue a, due to a signal with
γa >
1
2
. Consequently, the incumbent can have an objectively worse (γa < δ) or
better (γa > δ) signal than the challenger on issue a.
7 We assume γa to be a
random variable, distributed according to a continuous probability distribution
function f with support
[
1
2
, 1
]
; the cumulative distribution function is denoted
F . The precise value of γa is the incumbent’s private information. Notice that
it is commonly known that γb =
1
2
; therefore it is common knowledge that the
incumbent is never more competent on b than on a.
Second, while both candidates can make statements in the second period, which
6The challenger’s signals have the same precision as the voter’s signals. This is only for
notational ease; the results do not change substantially if we assume that the precision of
the voter’s signals differs from the precision of the challenger’s ones. Recall that δ is common
knowledge.
7The model can easily be extended to the case of a specialized challenger. This delivers no
further insights as most of the strategic behavior comes from the incumbent. The case of an
unspecialized incumbent, instead, is not relevant for our analysis, as it displays no incentive
at all for the incumbent to influence the voters’ perception of the issues.
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we consider as the proper election campaign, only the incumbent can take a
stand on the different issues in the first period. This can be viewed as the last
government period, in which he can propose or implement a policy on one of the
issues.8 Every politician can take a stand on each issue only once because they
effectively commit to the proposed policies.
Finally, with probability z the relevant issue is “urgent.” Then, it is the incum-
bent’s government responsibility to act immediately on a given issue. This puts a
restriction on the incumbent’s set of feasible strategies such that he has to act on
the urgent issue by announcing pIj in period 1. Urgency is a characteristic that
only relevant issues can have. Due to his position, the incumbent gets to know
whether there is an urgent issue and which issue it is through an extra private
signal ζ ∈ {a, b, ∅}.9
The challenger’s strategy is a mapping
σC : {−1, 1}2 × {∅,−1, 1}2 → {−1, 1}2, (1)
associating a pair of promises (pCa , p
C
b ) to thevector that includes the signals (ta, tb)
and the incumbent’s observed promise (if any).
The incumbent’s action space is instead {A,B, ∅} × {−1, 1}2, where A and B
indicate the choice of promising pIa or p
I
b , respectively, in the first period, and ∅
the waiting until the second period. With the signals on the states of the world
8This is without loss of generality. As will be clear from the description of the model, the
challenger has no extra information on the issues’ relevance that can induce the voters to
update their beliefs. Therefore an early announcement by the challenger would simply reveal
his strategic position to the incumbent, without changing the probability that the election
focuses on a specific issue.
9We interpret this sharp constraint implied by the urgent issues as follows. If the incumbent
remains inactive on that issue, its urgency will be revealed to the voters, and the incumbent
will not be elected in the subsequent election as a punishment for the absence of timely
measures. By the nature of urgency, politicians cannot hide an urgent issue from the public,
while they can make believe that an issue is urgent. For example, in the case of a potentially
pandemic flu, the government can promote a plan of vaccinations and a set of restrictive
measures to protect the country. Now, if the people get the vaccine, they cannot know for
sure whether it was really a critical situation or not; on the contrary, if the government
does not adopt any special measure and the flu spreads quickly, everyone will know that the
government failed to act on time.
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and the urgency, the incumbent’s strategy is
σI : {a, b, ∅} × {−1, 1}2 → {A,B, ∅} × {−1, 1}2, (2)
where the following restrictions from urgency apply:
σI(a, sa, sb) ∈ {A} × {−1, 1}2, (3)
σI(b, sa, sb) ∈ {B} × {−1, 1}2. (4)
No restriction applies to σI(∅, sa, sb).
2.3. Timing
Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the electoral campaign. At the beginning
of the first period, the voter, the incumbent, and the challenger receive signals
(r, va, vb), (ζ, sa, sb) and (ta, tb), respectively. In the first period, the incumbent
decides whether to promise pIa, p
I
b , or nothing, where his choice is constrained in
the case of an urgent issue. All other promises are revealed in the second period,
the electoral campaign period. In period 3, the voter casts his vote.
Information Actions
Voter
(r, va, vb)
Incumbent
(ζ, sa, sb; γa)
Challenger
(ta, tb) t = 1
Incumbent
pIa p
I
b ∅
t = 2
Incumbent
(pIa, p
I
b)
Challenger
(pCa , p
C
b )
t = 3
Voter
I C
Figure 1: Timing of the electoral campaign.
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2.4. Updated relevance
The voter updates the belief r according to the incumbent’s behavior. The up-
dating is induced by the possibility that the relevant issue is urgent, in which
case observing a promise on issue j in the first period is informative about its
relevance.
Consider issue a. With z being the probability that the relevant issue is urgent
and y the probability that a is spoken about in equilibrium when there is no
urgency, the posterior belief becomes via Bayes’ rule10
ρ =
(z + y(1− z))r
(z + y(1− z))r + (1− r)(1− z)y . (5)
If ρ is greater than 1
2
the voter bases his decision on issue a, which occurs when
r > (1−z)y
2y−(2y−1)z .
3. Equilibrium analysis
We now proceed to the analysis of the equilibrium behavior of the agents in
this electoral system. Given the voter’s behavioral voting rule (Section 2.1), and
his belief updating according to Bayes’ rule (Section 2.4), a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium of the campaining game is given by a pair of strategies (σI , σC) such
that (i) I maximizes his expected utility for each profile of signals (ζ, sa, sb), (ii) C
maximizes his conditional expected utility upon observing i’s first period promise
(if any) for each profile of signals (ta, tb), and (iii) beliefs are updated by Bayes’
rule, if possible.
10More extensively ρ is the probability that A is relevant given that the incumbent makes an
announcement over A in period 1. Such announcement can be due to (i) A being relevant and
urgent, which happens with probability zr; in this case the probability of an announcement
over A is 1, (ii) A being relevant and not urgent, which happens with probability r(1− z);
in this case the probability of an announcement over A is y, (iii) B being relevant and not
urgent, which happens with probability (1 − r)(1 − z); also in this case the probability of
an announcement over A is y. The only case in which there can be no early announcement
over A is when B is relevant and urgent (probability (1− r)(1− z)).
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The first aspect to be considered is what happens in the simplest case, in which
all the political action is concentrated in the second period. In this period the
candidates’ announcement has no effect on the voter’s belief about which issue is
relevant; therefore, announcements released in this stage cannot move the voter’s
attention from one issue to the other one. Hence, in this stage, candidates choose
on each issue the promise that is more likely to correspond to the voter’s belief
about the true state of the world. Notice that the voter receives informative
signals on both issues. As a consequence the candidates’ best promise is, on
each issue, their own belief on the true state of the world. This implies that
the challenger makes announcements according to his signals on both issues, and
the incumbent does the same on issue a; any announcement on issue b is an
equilibrium announcement for the incumbent, as his signal on b is uninformative.
The more interesting aspects of the model are related to the incumbent’s choice
of timing of his announcements, and to the challenger’s second period behavior
when the incumbent announces his policy promise in the first period.
To understand the incumbent’s behavior we first notice that, given the infor-
mational structure of this model, an early announcement on issue j increases
the perceived relevance of issue j. Therefore the incumbent makes a first period
promise on issue b only when he is forced to, i.e. when b is urgent. As for issue
a, it can be shown that also in the first period it is optimal for the incumbent
to promise what he believes to be the true state of the world, that is, pIa = sa.
The incumbent’s timing, instead, depends both on the precision of his signal sa
and on the challenger’s behavior. By announcing his policy promise pIa in the
first period, the incumbent reveals his information to the challenger. If the chal-
lenger never mimics the incumbent upon observing pIa, every type of incumbent
optimally promises pIa in the first period; in this way the incumbent increases
the likelihood that a is the decisive issue for the election, without changing the
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challenger’s behavior, that is, without altering the conditions of the competition.
If there is a positive probability that the challenger will mimic the incumbent’s
promises, instead, only incumbents with a low γa will make an early announce-
ment on a; a first period promise on a in this case has two effects: it increases the
likelihood that a will be the decisive issue, but it also reduces the incumbent’s
probability of winning the competition on issue a. As the cost of such early in-
tervention on a is increasing in γa, while the benefit is constant, the incumbent’s
strategy is characterized by a threshold below which the incumbent promises pIa
in the first period.
The challenger’s behavior, instead, can depend only on the distribution of γa,
not on γa itself. Given the incumbent’s threshold strategy, if f gives sufficient
weight to low competencies (E(γa) < δ), the challenger never mimics the incum-
bent; this implies that all types of incumbents are active in the first period. If
f gives sufficient weight to high competencies, so that the incumbent’s expected
precision conditional on the fact that he announces pIa in the first period is greater
than the challenger’s precision on a the challenger always mimics the incumbent.
In this case the challenger finds the incumbent’s signal more reliable in expecta-
tion than his own, even conditioning on the fact that the incumbent’s type is low
enough to speak in the first period.11 Intermediate cases generate challenger’s
mixed behavior. Proposition 1 fully characterizes the equilibrium behavior and
the relevant thresholds. The formal proof is included in the Appendix.
11The incumbent’s expected precision given that the challenger observes an early announcement
on a and given that the incumbent makes early announcements in absence of urgent issues
only for γa < Ξ is
(1− z)F (Ξ)2k
z(2k − 1) + (1− z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) +
z(2k − 1)
z(2k − 1) + (1− z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa).
The updating weights the incumbent’s unconditional expected type, and the expected type
when γa < Ξ for the (ex-post) probability that a is urgent and for the ex-post probability
that a is not urgent, respectively.
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Proposition 1 For any distribution of γa the following holds in equilibrium:
i. The challenger always promises pCb = tb. He promises p
C
a = ta if there has
been no announcement on a in the first period;
ii. The incumbent promises pIj = sj, j = a, b. If ζ = j he promises p
I
j in the
first period; if ζ = ∅ he promises pIb in the second period.
iii. The timing of the incumbent’s announcement on issue a when ζ = ∅ and
the challenger’s behavior when he observes pIa in the first period depend on
the distribution of γa as follows.
(Eq 1) E(γa) < δ.
The incumbent announces pIa in the first period and the challenger does
not mimic him.
(Eq 2) (1−z)F(Ξ)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F(Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F(Ξ)2kE(γa) > δ.
The incumbent announces pIa in the first period if and only if γa < Ξ,
where Ξ is the minimum between 1 and the solution to the following
implicit function and the maximum between 0.5 and the solution to
the implicit equation Ξ = δ+
([2F (Ξ)−(2F (Ξ)−1)z]−2F (Ξ)(1−z))( 14−δ+δ2)
(2k−1)(δ− 12)[2F (Ξ)−(2F (Ξ)−1)z]
. The
challenger mimics him on a.
(Eq 3) (1−z)F(Ξ)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F(Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F(Ξ)2kE(γa) < δ and E(γa) > δ.
The incumbent announces pIa in the first period if and only if γa <
Ξ(β∗), where Ξ(β∗) > Ξ is such that (1−z)F (Ξ(β
∗))2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ(β∗))2kE(γa|γa ≤
Ξ(β∗)) + z(2k−1)
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ(β∗))2kE(γa) = δ. The challenger mimics the
incumbent with probability β such that the incumbent is indifferent
between speaking in the first and in the second period when γa = Ξ(β
∗).
We focus our analysis on the case in which the challenger is unspecialized, while
the incumbent is specialized on issue a and less competent than the challenger
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on issue b. We do so because this is the parametric region in which the timing of
the election statements is most interesting. The model can be solved for all other
regions. In the following, we briefly describe what happens in the other cases.
When both politicians are unspecialized, the incumbent’s likelihood of winning
is the same regardless of which issue is considered by the voters. He therefore
has no incentive to distort the campaign. If the incumbent is better informed
on both issues, (γa > δa and γb > δb), the incumbent has even less incentives
to distort the campaign. His probability of winning if voters focus on any issue
j is
1+γj−δj
2
> 1
2
. Suppose now that he tries to distort the campaign in favor of
issue a: by doing so he reveals his signal on a, the challenger mimics him and his
probability of winning on issue a decreases to 1
2
, so that the incumbent now has
a higher probability of winning on issue b. However, the likelihood that voters
focus on issue a increases, so that the incumbent is unambiguously worse off by
trying to influence the debate. In the remaining cases of both politicians or only
the challenger being specialized, the intuition is the same as in our main analysis.
As long as the incumbent can increase his likelihood of winning by moving the
electorate’s attention to a particular issue, the behavior will qualitatively be as
predicted in the model. Only the parameter regions in which different equilibria
arise will change.
4. Distortions arising from political specialization
The behavior described in Proposition 1 generates distortions in the candidates’
behavior which decrease the probability that the policy implemented corresponds
to the true state of the world on the relevant issue. The benchmark is the case in
which both politicians follow their signal and the incumbent speaks in the first
period only when there is an urgency. In this scenario the probability of electing
a politician who implements the optimal policy is increasing in γa. This is due
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to the fact that a higher competence increases the probability that a candidate
promising the “correct” policy is offered in the election.
We can distinguish three distortions when the incumbent can choose to speak in
the first period without urgency. First, in the benchmark, the incumbent speaks
in the first period only when the issue is both urgent and relevant; therefore the
urgency of the issue reveals its relevance with certainty. Once the early statement
on issue a might be due to the incumbent’s interest, the urgency of such issue
can not always be recognized. Hence, the voter has a distorted expectation of
the relevant issue and may not vote optimally, as he assigns a probability smaller
than 1 to a being urgent when it is relevant. Since in every equilibrium there is
a positive probability that the incumbent speaks on a in the first period when a
is not urgent, the urgency of a can never be perfectly recognized.
Second, when the incumbent makes a statement on a in the absence of urgency
in the first period, he influences the agenda in the sense that he distorts the
perception of which issue is most likely to be relevant. The voter has a distorted
expectation of the relevant issue and may not vote optimally, as he assigns a
probability higher than r to a being the relevant issue. This distortion is present
in (Eq 1) for all incumbent’s types and in (Eq 2) and (Eq 3) for low incumbent’s
types.
The third effect results from the challenger mimicking the incumbent’s state-
ment. The probability that the election offers a candidate who promises the right
policy is diminished as a result of the challenger not using the information of his
signal. This effect has a positive side as well: due to the mimicking, the probabil-
ity that the incumbent is elected when the voters vote on issue a decreases, and
therefore the probability of having a candidate who implements the correct pol-
icy on b increases. However, the overall effect of this distortion is negative. This
type of distortion arises when the incumbent speaks in the first period without
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urgency and the challenger mimics the incumbent, and is therefore present only
when E(γa) > δ (i.e. for distributions of types that induce (Eq 2) and (Eq 3))
and for low types of the incumbent (i.e, γa smaller than the relevant threshold).
Moreover, since the probability of mimicking in (Eq 3) is β < 1, this distortion
has a smaller impact on (Eq 3) than on (Eq 2), so that (Eq 3) outperforms (Eq
2) for low types.
For exemplary parameter values, figure 2 illustrates the benchmark and the
three equilibria obtained under different distributions of γa.
12 A more detailed
and analytical analysis of the distortions that arise in the three types of equilib-
rium is included in the Appendix.
12γa is distributed according to Beta(αβ , ββ) distributions with parameter αβ = 2 and three
different parameters ββ ∈ {0.4, 2, 5}. E(γa) ≡ αβαβ+ββ .
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Figure 2: Probability of implementing the correct policy in different equilibria.
Example with k = 0.75, z = 0.1.
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It can be noticed that the probability of electing a politician who proposes the
correct policy is increasing in γa but it displays non-monotonic patterns in the
expected value of γa. This implies that an increase in the perceived specialization
of the incumbent does not necessarily imply a better outcome for the voters.
More precisely a low expected value of γa induces a higher welfare if the effective
specialization of the incumbent is low (i.e. (Eq 1) outperforms (Eq 2) and (Eq
3)); the converse is true when the effective specialization of the incumbent is
high. We can therefore conclude that a higher specialization of the incumbent
is beneficial for voters’ welfare; however, the perceived specialization may be
detrimental because it may trigger more distortions that affect negatively the
probability of implementing the correct policy.
5. Conclusion
This paper models a purely informational mechanism behind the incumbency
advantage. The model captures political moves such as German Chancellor Ger-
hard Schro¨der’s opposition to the Iraq War as described in the introduction. This
example shows how the incumbent used its government responsibility as well as
its alleged office-related informedness to influence the political agenda in his fa-
vor. Our formal treatment investigates the fundamental mechanism behind such
agenda setting and allows us to identify resulting distortions.
We analyze a two-period electoral campaign characterized by two policy is-
sues in which a specialized incumbent competes against an unspecialized, but
possibly more competent challenger. Due to his government responsibilities, the
incumbent’s statements can credibly attach importance to issues and influence
the political agenda. The analysis of this novel rationale for the incumbency
advantage delivers the following predictions.
First, the incumbent can be advantaged even when he is objectively worse than
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the challenger. In contrast, the hypothesis of an electoral selection process links
the incumbency advantage with superior quality of the incumbent.
Second, the incumbent does not always have incentives to influence the debate
and to use his advantage. If his signal is very informative, he waits to make a
statement and does not give the challenger the possibility to respond optimally to
his information. Indeed, the returns to incumbency are decreasing in the quality
of the incumbent. In other words, if his precise information makes re-election
probable enough in itself, he chooses not to influence the agenda. This is in line
with findings of the empirical literature which show that stronger incumbents have
smaller incentives to influence the elections (Aidt et al., 2011). Our introductory
example is a case in point since the incumbent coalition did poorly in the polls
when they changed the campaign strategy.
Finally, we show that even given that the incumbent’s incentives to distort the
campaign are decreasing in the incumbent’s quality, the probability of implement-
ing the correct policy is monotonically increasing in the degree of the incumbent’s
specialization; however, voters’ welfare behaves non-monotonically with respect
to the perceived degree of specialization. We show that having an incumbent
who is perceived as objectively worse than the challenger may be better for the
electorate than one who is perceived as partially more competent only on one of
the issues.
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A. Proof of Proposition 1
We proceed in proving Proposition 1 by a sequence of claims. Remember that the
voter focuses only on the issue that he believes to be more likely to be relevant.
We begin our analysis with the behavior of candidates in the second period, when
nothing has been announced in the first period. Note that that even though the
voter is not perfectly informed on the state of the world, the best that each can-
didate can do at the last stage, given the his opponent’s behavior, is to try his
best to match the correct state of the world. This implies that the challenger
promises pj = tj for every issue j and that the incumbent promises pa = sa; the
incumbent’s promise on issue b is undetermined, as his signal on b is uninforma-
tive.
Claim 2 If nothing has been announced in the first period on issue j, the best
that the challenger can do is to promise pj = tj for any possible strategy of the
incumbent.
Proof.
When nothing has been announced in the first period, the announcement game
between the challenger and the incumbent is a simultaneous game. In this claim
we show that following his own signal tj is a dominant strategy for the challenger.
The incumbent’s possible pure strategies on each issue are 4, pIj = 1, p
I
j = −1,
pIj = sj and p
I
j = −sj. Table A shows, for the case in which tj = 1 the challenger’s
winning probability if he chooses pCj = 1 and p
C
j = −1, and j is the decisive issue.
To understand how each entry in the table is computed, consider for example the
probability of winning when tj = 1 and both the incumbent and the challenger
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follow their signal,
Pr(sj = 1|ωj = 1) · Pr(ωj = 1|tj = 1) · 1
2
+ Pr(sj = −1|ωj = 1) · Pr(ωj = 1|tj = 1) · δ
+ Pr(sj = 1|ωj = −1) · Pr(ωj = −1|tj = 1) · 1
2
+ Pr(sj = −1|ωj = −1) · Pr(ωj = −1|tj = 1) · (1− δ)
Notice that when both candidates make the same announcement, each one has
a winning probability of 1
2
, while when they make different announcements the
candidate who makes the promise equal to the true state of the world wins with
probability δ, while the candidate that makes the promise that is different from
the true state of the world wins with probability 1 − δ. This is due to the fact
that the precision of the voter’s signals is δ.
Notice moreover that we indicate with E(γj) the expected precision of the
incumbent, where E(γa) > E(γb) = 12 .
tj = 1 Incumbent
pIj = 1 p
I
j = −1 pIj = sj pIj = −sj
Challenger
pCj = 1
1
2
δ2 1
2
+
E(γj)
2
− δ
2
1− E(γj)
2
+ E(γj)δ
+(1− δ)2 −E(γj)δ + δ2 +δ2 − 32δ
pCj = −1 2(1− δ)δ 12 32δ +
E(γj)j
2
1
2
+ δ
2
− E(γj)
2
−δ2 − E(γj)δ −δ2 + E(γj)δ
Table 1: Challenger’s expected probability of winning on issue j.
It can be easily seen that pCj = 1 is dominant when tj = 1. The same reasoning
can be replicated for tj = −1. Hence, it is a dominant strategy for the challenger
make promises in accordance with his own signal.
Claim 3 If nothing has been announced in the first period on issue a the best
that the incumbent can do is to promise pa = sa in the second period; any an-
nouncement on issue b in the second period is an equilibrium announcement.
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Proof. The statement can be proved following the proof of Claim 2. The incum-
bent’s probability of winning when sj = 1, for example, can be found in Table
A
sj = 1 Challenger
pCj = 1 p
C
j = −1 pCj = tj pCj = −tj
Incumbent
pIj = 1
1
2
γjδ
1
2
+ γjδ +
δ
2
1− γ
2
+ γδ
+(1− γj)(1− δ) −γj2 − δ2 +δ2 − 32δ
pIj = −1 (1− γj)δ 12 32δ +
γj
2
1
2
− δ
2
+ γ
2
+γj(1− δ) −δ2 − γjδ +δ2 − γjδ
Table 2: Incumbent’s expected probability of winning on issue j.
It can be easily checked that, given δ > 1
2
, pa = sa is a dominant strategy as
long as γa >
1
2
. As for issue b, every strategy delivers the same probability of
winning, given that γb =
1
2
. The incumbent’s expected probability of winning on
issue b when sb = 1 is represented in Table A.
sj = 1 Challenger
pCj = 1 p
C
j = −1 pCj = tj pCj = −tj
Incumbent
pIj = 1
1
2
1
2
1
4
+ δ − δ2 3
4
− δ + δ2
pIj = −1 12 12 14 + δ − δ2 34 − δ + δ2
Table 3: Incumbent’s expected probability of winning on issue b.
Now we consider the incumbent’s strategy in the first period. We begin such
analysis by noticing that it is never optimal for the challenger to mimic the
incumbent’s behavior on issue b, and nor for the incumbent to promise something
on issue b, given that his signal on b is uninformative.
Claim 4 The challenger does not mimic any first period announcement on b; the
incumbent announces pIb in period 1 only if ζ = B.
Proof. First of all notice that the incumbent is completely uninformed on issue
b. Therefore, for any value of sb, Pr [ωb = −1|sb] = Pr [ωb = 1|sb] = 12 .
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As a first consequence of this, the challenger never finds profitable to mimic his
promise on b in the second period; by mimicking the incumbent’s behavior the
challenger’s probability of winning is 1
2
, while by not mimicking it is δ2+(1−δ)2 >
1
2
.
Therefore the only effect that the incumbent has on the electoral campaign
if he promises pIb in the first period is to increase the perceived relevance of b,
that is to increase the probability that b is the decisive issue. This implies that
his probability of winning by releasing an early statement on b is lower than his
probability of winning when he waits the second period to make announcements.
We now consider the challenger’s mimicking incentives when the incumbent
makes an early announcement on a.
Claim 5 Assume that a set G of incumbent’s types promise pIa = sa in the first
period when ζ = ∅, while types which belong to the complement set do not promise
anything in the first period. In this case the challenger mimics the incumbent’s
promise iff (1−z)F (G)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (G)2kE(γa|γa ∈ G) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (G)2kE(γa) > δ.
Proof. Let E(γa|A) be the expected γa conditional to the fact that the in-
cumbent has announced his policy in the first period. Upon observing pIa an-
nounced in the first period, the challenger believes that a is urgent with prob-
ability z(2k−1)
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (G)2k , where F (G) is the measure of the set G. This comes
from the fact that the challenger believes that a is relevant with probability2k−1
2k
,
and that the relevant issue is urgent with probability z. Therefore
E(γa|A) =
(1− z)F (G)2k
z(2k − 1) + (1− z)F (G)2kE(γa|γa ∈ G) +
z(2k − 1)
z(2k − 1) + (1− z)F (G)2kE(γa)
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Given that he does not affect which issue the election is decided upon, the
challenger chooses his optimal promise on each issue a in order to maximize
the probability of winning if a is decisive. This probability is equal to 1
2
if the
challenger mimics the incumbent by setting pCa = p
I
a.
If ta = p
I
a the challenger trivially sets p
C
a = ta = p
I
a and wins with probability
1
2
. If ta 6= pIa and the challenger does not mimic the incumbent, his probability of
winning is
Pr(ωa = ta|ta 6= sa)δ + Pr(ωa = −ta|ta 6= sa)(1− δ)
=
δ(1− E(γa|A))
δa(1− E(γa|A)) + E(γa|A)(1− δ)
δ +
(1− δ)E(γa|A)
δa(1− E(γa|A)) + E(γa|A)(1− δ)
(1− δ)
which is greater than 1
2
if E(γj|A) > δ.
We now focus on the incumbent’s behavior on issue a. First we show that it is
optimal for the incumbent to promise pIa = sa also when he makes announcements
in the first period. Then we show that the incumbent’s strategy is monotone in
γa; for a given strategy of the challenger, if a type γ¯a finds optimal to make an
early announcement on a, any lower type (γa < γ¯a) finds it optimal too.
Claim 6 The incumbent promises pIa = sa also in the first period.
Proof. There are two possible cases, depending on the challenger’s behavior.
i. If the challenger mimics the incumbent, then the probability of winning on
that issue is 1
2
regardless of what the incumbent promised.
ii. If there is a positive probability that the challenger does not mimic the
incumbent, then promising pIj = sj yields a strictly higher payoff, as shown
in the simultaneous case.
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Claim 7 The incumbent’s optimal timing strategy is monotone in his type: if it
is optimal for the incumbent to speak on a for some type γ¯a, then it is optimal
for him to speak also for any γa < γ¯a. Moreover, if the challenger mimics the
incumbent with probability 1, such threshold is given by Ξ defined as the minimum
of 1 and the solution to the following implicit equation and the maximum of 0.5
and the solution to the implicit equation
Ξ = δ +
([2F (Ξ)− (2F (Ξ)− 1)z]− 2F (Ξ)(1− z)) (1
4
− δ + δ2)
(2k − 1) (δ − 1
2
)
[2F (Ξ)− (2F (Ξ)− 1)z] .
Proof. Assume that the challenger mimics the incumbent if he speaks in the
first period, and suppose that in equilibrium it is optimal for the incumbent to
speak on a for some type γ¯a. In this case it is optimal for him to speak also for
any γa < γ¯a. To see this, let G be the set of types of the incumbent that speak
on a in equilibrium in the first period, and let F (G) be the probability that the
incumbent’s type belongs to the set G. Assume that γ¯a ∈ G. In this case the
incumbent finds optimal to speak on a in the first period if
k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]− (1− z)F (G)
k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]
1
2
+
(1− z)F (G)
k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]
(
1
4
+ δ − δ2
)
(6)
is greater than
2k − 1
2k
(
1
2
+ γaδ −
γa
2
+
δ
2
− δ2
)
+
1
2k
(
1
4
+ δ − δ2
)
. (7)
Consider now γa /∈ G such that γa < γ¯a. The first equation does not depend
on the choice of type γa: even if type γa chooses to speak in the first period,
and by doing so belongs to G, this does not affect the probability of G given
the continuity of the probability distribution. This said, the difference between
the two equations is decreasing in γa, therefore if the inequality holds for γ¯a it
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holds also for every γa < γ¯a. The incumbent’s choice is thus characterized by a
threshold below which the incumbent will speak on a in the first period.
By equating (6) and (7) we find that the threshold when the challenger mimics
the incumbent with probability 1 is Ξ defined as the minimum of 1 and the
solution to the implicit equation and the maximum of 0.5 and the solution to the
implicit equation
Ξ = δ +
([2F (Ξ)− (2F (Ξ)− 1)z]− 2F (Ξ)(1− z)) (1
4
− δ + δ2)
(2k − 1) (δ − 1
2
)
[2F (Ξ)− (2F (Ξ)− 1)z]
= δ +
z
(
δ − 1
2
)2
(2k − 1) (δ − 1
2
)
[2F (Ξ)− (2F (Ξ)− 1)z]
= δ +
z
(
δ − 1
2
)
(2k − 1)[2F (Ξ)− (2F (Ξ)− 1)z] . (8)
The same reasoning can be applied to the case in which the challenger mimics
the incumbent only with probability β < 1.
Claims 8, 9 and 10 analyze the equilibrium behavior in the three different
parametric regions.
Claim 8 If E(γa) < δ the incumbent announces pIa in the first period and the
challenger does not mimic him.
Proof. Let the unconditional expected value of γa be smaller than δ. This
implies that the expected precision of the incumbent given that he speaks in the
first period is never be greater than δ, given that the incumbent adopts a threshold
strategy in which he make early announcements for low types (Claim 7). As a
consequence, promising sa in the first period is always optimal for the incumbent,
since it increases the probability that the voters look at issue a without inducing
any loss in terms of probability of winning on issue a.
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Claim 9 If (1−z)F (Ξ)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa) > δ the
incumbent announces pIa in the first period if and only if γa < Ξ and the challenger
mimics him on a with probability 1.
Proof. We proved in Claim 7 that the incumbent makes an early announcement
on issue a for types γ < Ξ even if the challenger mimics him with probability 1.
If (1−z)F (Ξ)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa) > δ, the incumbent’s
expected precision when he makes an early announcement on issue a (which is
weakly larger than the LHS of the inequality) is larger than the challenger’s
precision. Therefore the challenger mimics the incumbent with probability 1.
Hence Ξ is the threshold of the incumbent’s equilibrium strategy.
Claim 10 Let (1−z)F (Ξ)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa) < δ
and E(γa) > δ. The incumbent announces pIa in the first period if and only
if γa < Ξ(β
∗), where Ξ(β∗) > Ξ is such that (1−z)F (Ξ(β
∗))2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ(β∗))2kE(γa|γa ≤
Ξ(β∗)) + z(2k−1)
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ(β∗))2kE(γa) = δ. The challenger mimics the incumbent
with probability β∗ such that the incumbent is indifferent between speaking in the
first and in the second period when γa = Ξ(β
∗).
Proof. Notice that this is possible only when Ξ < 1. We analyze the situa-
tion by considering the challenger’s possible strategies, and the incumbent’s best
responses to them:
i. If the challenger never mimics the incumbent when he makes a promise on
a in the first period, the incumbent announces pIa = sa in the first period
for any value of γa. However, it is optimal for the challenger to mimic the
incumbent, given that E(γa) > δ.
ii. If the challenger always mimics the incumbent when he makes a promise on
a in the first period, the incumbent announces pIa = sa in the first period
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for any γa < Ξ. However, the challenger has no incentive to mimic the
incumbent, given that the expected precision of the incumbent signal is
(1−z)F (Ξ)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ)2kE(γa) < δ.
iii. If the challenger mimics the incumbent with probability 0 < β < 1, the
incumbent has an incentive to promise pIa = sa in the first period as long as
the incumbent’s probability of winning by announcing pIa = sa in the first
period is greater than his probability of winning by being silent in the first
period. Let G = [0.5,Ξ(β)] be the set of types who speak in the first period.
The probability of winning by announcing pIa = sa in the first period is, for
an incumbent with type γa,
k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]− (1− z)F (G)
k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]
(
β
1
2
+ (1− β)
(
1
2
+ γaδ −
γa
2
+
δ
2
− δ2
))
+
(1− z)F (G)
k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]
(
1
4
+ δ − δ2
)
, (9)
while his probability of winning by being silent in the first period is
2k − 1
2k
(
1
2
+ γaδ −
γa
2
+
δ
2
− δ2
)
+
1
2k
(
1
4
+ δ − δ2
)
. (10)
We first notice that, if γa ≤ δ, it is always optimal for the incumbent to
speak in the first period. If γa > δ, instead, it is optimal for the incumbent
to announce sa in the first period only for low values of β, in particular for
β <
z
(
γa − 12
)
(2k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]− 2(1− z)F (G)) (γa − δ)
. (11)
Now we consider the effect of γa on the difference between equations (9)
and (10). Such effect is(
(1− β)k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]− (1− z)F (G)
k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z] −
2k − 1
2k
)(
δ − 1
2
)
.
(12)
The effect is negative for
β >
z
2k[2F (G)− (2F (G)− 1)z]− 2(1− z)F (G) . (13)
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Given that z
2k[2F (G)−(2F (G)−1)z]−2(1−z)F (G) <
z(γa− 12)
(2k[2F (G)−(2F (G)−1)z]−2(1−z)F (G))(γa−δ)
the incumbent’s behavior can be summarized as follows:
• if β ≤ z(γa−
1
2)
(2k[2F (G)−(2F (G)−1)z]−2(1−z)F (G))(γa−δ) the incumbent always choose
to make an early announcement on a;
• if β > z(γa−
1
2)
(2k[2F (G)−(2F (G)−1)z]−2(1−z)F (G))(γa−δ) the incumbent has a thresh-
old strategy such that he releases early announcements for low values
of γa and waits for high values.
We have shown above that no equilibrium can exist in which all types of
the incumbent speak in the first period. Therefore the equilibrium must
arise with β >
z(γa− 12)
(2k[2F (G)−(2F (G)−1)z]−2(1−z)F (G))(γa−δ) . Keeping in mind that
G = [0.5,Ξ(β)] we can see that the threshold Ξ(β) is the minimum between
1 and the solution to the following implicit equation and the maximum
of 0.5 and the solution to the implicit equation, which results from the
indifference of the incumbent between speaking and not-speaking in the
first period.
Ξ(β) =
δ (2k[2F (Ξ(β))− (2F (Ξ(β))− 1)z]− 2(1− z)F (Ξ(β)))− z
2
β (2k[2F (Ξ(β))− (2F (Ξ(β))− 1)z]− 2(1− z)F (Ξ(β)))− z . (14)
Notice that Ξ(1) = Ξ, therefore
(1− z)F (Ξ(1))2k
z(2k − 1) + (1− z)F (Ξ(1))2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ(1))+
z(2k − 1)
z(2k − 1) + (1− z)F (Ξ(1))2kE(γa) < δ.
Moreover Ξ
(
z(γa− 12)
(2k[2F (G)−(2F (G)−1)z]−2(1−z)F (G))(γa−δ)
)
= 1, therefore the con-
ditional expected value is just E(γa) > δ. Given these two relations, and
given the continuity of Ξ(β) (implied by the continuity of the density func-
tion) there exists at least one β∗ ∈
(
z(γa− 12)
(2k[2F (G)−(2F (G)−1)z]−2(1−z)F (G))(γa−δ) , 1
)
such that
(1− z)F (Ξ(β∗))2k
z(2k − 1) + (1− z)F (Ξ(1))2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ(β
∗))+
z(2k − 1)
z(2k − 1) + (1− z)F (Ξ(β∗))2kE(γa) = δ.
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Therefore there is at least one equilibrium in which the incumbent promises
pIa = sa in the first period for any γa < Ξ(β
∗), such that (1−z)F (Ξ(β
∗))2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ(β∗))2kE(γa|γa ≤
Ξ(β∗))+ z(2k−1)
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F (Ξ(β∗))2kE(γa) = δ, and the challenger mimics him with prob-
ability β∗. Moreover all the equilibria in this region have this same structure.
B. Distortions arising from political specialisation
B.1. Benchmark
The probability of voting such that the correct policy on the relevant issue is
implemented in our benchmark case is:
Pr(ωrel = p
∗
rel) = z {E (r) (1− (1− γa)(1− δa)) + E (1− r) (1− (1− γb)(1− δb))}
+(1− z)
{
Pr
(
r >
1
2
)[
E
(
r|r > 1
2
)
(1− (1− γa)(1− δa))
+ E
(
1− r|r > 1
2
)(
1 + γa − δa
2
γb +
1− γa + δa
2
δb
)]
+ Pr
(
r <
1
2
)[
E
(
(1− r)|r < 1
2
)
(1− (1− γb)(1− δb))
+ E
(
r|r < 1
2
)(
1 + γb − δb
2
γa +
1− γb + δb
2
δa
)]}
. (15)
In fact, with probability z the issue is urgent and the incumbent is forced to
act in the first period. The voters recognize that the issue must be relevant and
vote accordingly. With probability 1 − z the issue is not relevant. In this case
the voters’ behavior depends on the realization of the public signal r. If r > 1
2
,
the voters’ choice is based on issue a; they will be able to choose a candidate
with the correct proposed policy with probability 1− (1−γa)(1− δa). Therefore,
this candidate will be elected that offers the best policy on a. With probability
1− r, however, the relevant issue is b. If the incumbent is elected (which happens
with probability 1+γa−δa
2
) the probability of having the correct policy on b is γb;
if the challenger is elected (with probability 1−γa+δa
2
) the probability of having a
correct policy on b is δb. If r <
1
2
, the voters base their choice on issue b and the
probability of voting for the correct policy is symmetric.
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B.2. Analysis of the distortions
We separately consider the three parametric regions that are relevant for the
equilibrium analysis.
E(γa) < δ. In this case the incumbent always speaks early on issue a and the
challenger never mimicks him; the expected welfare given γa becomes:
Pr(ωrel = p
∗
rel) = z {E (1− r) (1− (1− γb)(1− δb))}
+(1− z + z · E(r))
{
Pr
(
r >
1
2
)[
E
(
r|r > 1
2
)
[1− (1− γa)(1− δa)]
+ E
(
1− r|r > 1
2
)(
1 + γa − δa
2
γb +
1− γa + δa
2
δb
)]
+ Pr
(
1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)[
E
(
r|1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)
[1− (1− γa)(1− δa)]
+ E
(
1− r|1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)(
1 + γa − δa
2
γb +
1− γa + δa
2
δb
)]
+ Pr
(
r ≤ 1− z
2− z
)[
E
(
1− r|r ≤ 1− z
2− z
)
[1− (1− γb)(1− δb)]
+ E
(
r|r ≤ 1− z
2− z
)(
1 + γb − δb
2
γa +
1− γb + δb
2
δa
)]}
. (16)
The incumbent makes an early statement on issue a. This results in two
distortions due to the voters inference regarding the relevance and urgency
of the issue. Since the incumbent only speaks on a, urgency is recognized on
issue b. Issue a, however, cannot be identified as urgent when it is. In this
case, the voter is harmed since they do not gain certainty about the relevant
issue, as they do in the benchmark case. Furthermore, the probability that
issue a is the relevant one is distorted. For values of r between 1−z
2−z and
1
2
the voters vote on issue a, although b is more likely to be the relevant issue.
(1−z)F(Ξ)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F(Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F(Ξ)2kE(γa) < δ and E(γa) > δ.
Whenever E(γa) > δ the equilibria display the following behavior: the in-
cumbent makes an early annoucement for low types, and speaks in the
second period for high types; the challenger mimicks him with positive
probability whenever he speaks. The differences are the threshold type that
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induces the incumbent to change behavior and the probability of mimicking.
In this first region the threshold type is Ξ(β∗), and the probability of mim-
icking is β ∈ [0, 1]. The expected welfare depends on whether γa > Ξ(β∗)
or not.
• γa > Ξ(β∗). If the incumbent’s competence is such that he only speaks
on urgent issues and then gets mimicked by the challenger with prob-
ability β, the probability of electing a candidate who proposes the
correct policy on the relevant issue is,
Pr(ωrel = p
∗
rel) = z {E (r) [βγa + (1− β) (1− (1− γa)(1− δa))] + E (1− r) (1− (1− γb)(1− δb))}
+(1− z)
{
Pr
(
r >
1
2
)[
E
(
r|r > 1
2
)
(1− (1− γa)(1− δa))
+ E
(
1− r|r > 1
2
)(
1 + γa − δa
2
γb +
1− γa + δa
2
δb
)]
+ Pr
(
r <
1
2
)[
E
(
(1− r)|r < 1
2
)
(1− (1− γb)(1− δb))
+ E
(
r|r < 1
2
)(
1 + γb − δb
2
γa +
1− γb + δb
2
δa
)]}
. (17)
where β = β∗.
The incumbent only speaks when the issue is urgent, similar to the
benchmark. If this issue is a, the high expected competence E(γa)
makes the challenger mimic the incumbent with probability β, thus
reducing the probability that a candidate with the right policy is up for
election from 1−(1−γa)(1−δa) to βγa+(1−β) (1− (1− γa)(1− δa)).
• γa < Ξ(β∗). If the challenger speaks early and is mimicked by the
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challenger with probability β, the expected welfare becomes
Pr(ωrel = p
∗
rel) = z {E (1− r) (1− (1− γb)(1− δb))} (18)
+(1− z + z · E(r))
{
Pr(r >
1
2
)β
[
E(r|r > 1
2
)[γa] + E(1− r|r >
1
2
)
γb + δb
2
]
+ Pr
(
r >
1
2
)
(1− β)
[
E
(
r|r > 1
2
)
[1− (1− γa)(1− δa)]
+ E
(
1− r|r > 1
2
)(
1 + γa − δa
2
γb +
1− γa + δa
2
δb
)]
+ Pr(
1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)β
[
E(r|1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)[γa] + E(1− r|
1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)
γb + δb
2
]
+ Pr
(
1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)
(1− β)
[
E
(
r|1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)
[1− (1− γa)(1− δa)]
+ E
(
1− r|1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)(
1 + γa − δa
2
γb +
1− γa + δa
2
δb
)]
+ Pr(r ≤ 1− z
2− z )β
[
E(1− r|r ≤ 1− z
2− z )[1− (1− γb)(1− δb)] + E(r|r ≤
1− z
2− z )
γa + δa
2
]
+ Pr
(
r ≤ 1− z
2− z
)
(1− β)
[
E
(
1− r|r ≤ 1− z
2− z
)
[1− (1− γb)(1− δb)]
+ E
(
r|r ≤ 1− z
2− z
)(
1 + γb − δb
2
γa +
1− γb + δb
2
δa
)]}
.
(1−z)F(Ξ)2k
z(2k−1)+(1−z)F(Ξ)2kE(γa|γa ≤ Ξ) + z(2k−1)z(2k−1)+(1−z)F(Ξ)2kE(γa) < δ In this case the
incumbent makes an early annoucement forγa < Ξ, and speaks in the second
period for higher types; the challenger mimicks him whenever he speaks
early. The expected welfare depends on γa.
• γa > Ξ. If the incumbent’s competence is such that he only speaks on
urgent issues and then gets mimicked by the challenger, the probability
of electing a candidate who proposes the correct policy on the relevant
issue is,
Pr(ωrel = p
∗
rel) = z {E (r) γa + E (1− r) (1− (1− γb)(1− δb))}
+(1− z)
{
Pr
(
r >
1
2
)[
E
(
r|r > 1
2
)
(1− (1− γa)(1− δa))
+ E
(
1− r|r > 1
2
)(
1 + γa − δa
2
γb +
1− γa + δa
2
δb
)]
+ Pr
(
r <
1
2
)[
E
(
(1− r)|r < 1
2
)
(1− (1− γb)(1− δb))
+ E
(
r|r < 1
2
)(
1 + γb − δb
2
γa +
1− γb + δb
2
δa
)]}
. (19)
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The incumbent only speaks when the issue is urgent, similar to the
benchmark. If this issue is a, the high expected competence E(γa)
makes the challenger mimic the incumbent, thus reducing the prob-
ability that a candidate with the right policy is up for election from
1− (1− γa)(1− δa) to γa.
• γa < Ξ.
If the challenger speaks early and is mimicked by the challenger, the
expected welfare becomes
Pr(ωrel = p
∗
rel) = z {E (1− r) (1− (1− γb)(1− δb))} (20)
+(1− z + z · E(r))
{
Pr(r >
1
2
)
[
E(r|r > 1
2
)[γa] + E(1− r|r >
1
2
)
γb + δb
2
]
+ Pr(
1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)
[
E(r|1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)[γa] + E(1− r|
1− z
2− z < r ≤
1
2
)
γb + δb
2
]
+ Pr(r ≤ 1− z
2− z )
[
E(1− r|r ≤ 1− z
2− z )[1− (1− γb)(1− δb)] + E(r|r ≤
1− z
2− z )
γa + δa
2
]}
.
In this case the incumbent makes an early statement and gets mim-
icked by the challenger. On top of the distortions present in the pre-
vious case, the imitation reduces the probability that a candidate who
proposes the right policy is available, as in the first range considered.
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